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I       Introduction 
 
In this paper, we explore the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the 
competitiveness of emerging economies and economic integration.  
 
We structure the paper as follows. Following this Introduction (Section I), in Section 
II, we assess briefly and critically extant theories of FDI and the MNE. In Section III, 
we critically assess competitiveness and catching-up theory and policy and the role of 
FDI in this context. Section IV sets off from limitations of extant scholarship 
identified in the previous section to develop a novel framework for competitiveness 
and catching-up and discuss the role of FDI, clusters and government policy in its 
context. Section V discusses ways through which emerging economies can effect 
economic integration through enhanced competitiveness and accelerated catching-up, 
by leveraging strategies informed from recent developments on scholarship in 
International Business (IB) strategy. Section VI summarizes and concludes.  
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II. THEORY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) AND THE 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (MNE) 
 
II.1 Extant Theory of FDI and the MNE 
The theory of FDI and the MNE dates back to Stephen Hymer’s PhD dissertation, 
completed in 1960, and published in 1976. Hymer is arguably the father-figure of the 
theory of the MNE because he is the first scholar who posed the question why foreign 
direct investment (FDI), vis-à-vis alternative modalities of  what he called ‘foreign 
operations’, like licensing, tacit collusion, joint ventures, etc (Dunning and Pitelis, 
2008)2. Accordingly, Hymer posed the questions ‘why internalize’, for the case of the 
MNE, much in line with Coase’s (1937) similar question for the national firm3. 
Hymer attributed the benefits of FDI to the advantages of the control it conferred to 
firms. He proposed three reasons for the choice of FDI. The ‘Removal of conflict-
Rivalry’ between firms in international markets, and the exploitation of the 
(monopolistic) Advantages of firms were the two major reasons. ‘Diversification of 
risk’ was the third, less important one for Hymer, because it did not involve control. 
Through FDI firms could both reduce the forces of Rivalry in international markets, 
and exploit their monopolistic Advantages better than through the open market. That 
was possible for numerous ‘market failure’ (or intra-firm success)-related reasons, to 
include the avoidance of bilateral oligopoly, difficulties of finding licensees in foreign 
countries, honest or dishonest differences in the perceptions of the value of the 
advantage, etc. All these have predated more recent literatures, as documented in 
Casson (1990), Horaguchi and Toyne (1990), Pitelis (2002), and Dunning and Pitelis 
(2008). 
                                               
2
 Earlier contributions to the literature included both Edith Penrose (1956) and John Dunning (1958), 
indeed Hymer (1976) cites both Dunning and Penrose in his PhD thesis. However, neither Penrose, nor 
Dunning had posed the question why FDI (intra-firm) versus inter-firm foreign operations. 
3
 Indeed he even used the verb ‘internalize’ already in the PhD thesis  “The firm is a practical devise 
which substitutes for the market. The firm internalizes or supersedes the market” (Hymer, 1976, p. 48) 
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While the Coasean question ‘why internalize’, was already present in 1960, Hymer 
only pursued explicitly Coase’s arguments later, in a 1968 article. He also quoted 
Coase in Hymer 1970 and 19724. Post-Hymer developments of the MNE zeroed on 
the ‘why internalize the advantages’ question. Various important contributions 
emphasized different reasons. Buckley and Casson (1976) focused on the public good 
character of ‘intangible assets’, which are susceptible to ‘market failure’ if they are 
not exploited internally, while Williamson (1981) stressed post-contract hold-ups, in 
the case of ‘opportunistic’ licensees and investments in specific assets. 
 
Post-Hymer ‘internalization’ theorists did not address the issue of location. Dunning 
(1958) had done so, and indeed Hymer discussed locational factors under various 
guises, for example, exploitation of foreign assets, better demand conditions abroad 
etc., see Dunning and Pitelis (2008). Location is most crucial, indeed a sine-qua-non 
or the theory of the MNE (Dunning 1998). One reason is that, in effect, most 
questions on the MNE are also applicable for the case of non-MNEs. Penrose (1987) 
criticized both Hymer-type and Coase-type application to the theory of the MNE, for 
failing to distinguish between intra-country and inter-national expansion. For inter-
country expansion the crucial issue of course, is the investment in different countries. 
This is a locational issue. In addition, it is an issue that involves location under 
different cross-border regulatory jurisdictions (Pitelis and Boddewyn, 2009). In this 
context, the whole debate on why MNEs can usefully be subdivided to three sub-
questions. First, why internationalization. Second, why integration/internalization. 
Third, which location, which in this case means which country. 
                                               
4
 Hymer’s analysis and, even, terminology in this article incorporates most major contributions of the 
post-Coase transaction costs literature, see Dunning and Pitelis (2008). 
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In Hymer (1976, 1970, 1972) why internationalization (why foreign operations in his 
words), is explained in terms of push and pull factors, such as external market 
opportunity, product life cycle considerations, and differential demand conditions 
(e.g. mature domestic markets), (see Pitelis (2002a). Such considerations, especially 
when viewed in line with other ‘locational’ considerations by Hymer (see Dunning 
and Pitelis 2008) also provide an indirect answer to the question ‘which country’. 
Instead, the ‘internalization school’ did not focus on the questions ‘why 
internationalization’ and ‘which country/location’. It is John Dunning’s OLI that 
envelopes all three aspects. In the OLI, O stand for Ownership advantages specific to 
the firm (which need not be monopolistic, but could also be due to efficiency). L 
stands for Locational advantages, and I for Internalization advantages. The main idea 
is that given O, L will explain the choice of location, and I the choice of modality. In 
terms of our questions, L explains ‘which country’ (and up to a point ‘why 
internationalization’) and I, why internalization. O is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for both ‘internationalization’ and ‘internalization’. 
 
OLI has served and is serving an important role in the literature in part because of its 
paradigmatic nature, and in part because of the agility and ability of its proponents to 
incorporate new ideas and developments, as well as to propose new ones (Dunning, 
2000, 2005; Dunning and Lundan, 2006).5 As Dunning (2001) points out, it is 
arguable that in its early manifestation in the OLI, has paid limited attention to the 
endogeneity of advantages,  in particular the link between intra-firm knowledge 
generation, O advantages and their relation to L, and I advantages - and thus (up to a 
                                               
5
 Dunning (2005), for example, proposes institution-seeking FDI, an idea in line with the knowledge-
based perspective. 
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point) the OLI underplayed the firm as a strategic actor.6 Moreover, and similar to the 
internalization theories, the quasi-exogeneity of O, L and I also implied that the 
framework could benefit from a more dynamic, strategic, entrepreneurial and 
knowledge-learning-based foundation.7 We contend that Penrose’s contribution to the 
theory of (the growth of) the firm can serve such a purpose. At the same time, 
however, a learning-based perspective goes beyond extant theory of the OLI, by 
introducing a cognitive and entrepreneurial agency dimension, missing from the OLI 
(Spender, 1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 In contrast to some critics (e.g., Teece, 2006), Hymer had examined the historical evolution of O 
advantages in the context of his “‘law’ of increasing firm size” (Hymer, 1972), yet failed to see 
advantages as a process of endogenous knowledge generation and (thus) firm growth. That task was 
performed by Penrose (1959) and up to a point by evolutionary models of the MNE, such as Kogut and 
Zander’s (1993). Despite significant progress in dynamising and extending the OLI (e.g., Dunning, 
2001), an application of Penrose’s intra-firm knowledge generation dynamic to the OLI has not been 
attempted before. 
7
 No detailed explanation of intra-firm advantages generation has been provided in extant Hymer, 
transaction costs and (thus) early OLI-based theories.  The intra-firm focus is specific to Penrose (and 
subsequent resource-based-view (RBV) scholarship, see, for example, Pitelis, 2006, for a recent 
account). 
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II.2 A Knowledge-Learning-based Approach 
A founder of the knowledge-learning-based theory of the firm is Edith Penrose 
(Penrose, 1959; Spender, 1994; Pitelis, 2000). Penrose was one of the earlier 
contributors to the MNE, her 1956 article in the Economic Journal, appeared prior to 
Hymer’s PhD thesis. As discussed by others, e.g. Dunning (2003), Pitelis (2000, 
2004, 2007), Kay (1999), Rugman and Verbeke (2002), Penrose dealt extensively 
with MNEs and MNE-country relationships in general (e.g., the 1956 article), and in 
particular in the context of the ‘international oil industry’ and Arab countries. In the 
context of this work, Penrose was one of the earlier contributors to issues of ‘transfer 
pricing’, ‘dumping’, ‘infant-firm’ arguments (in support to some protectionism).8 All 
these are also of importance to the issue of economic integration, see next section. 
However, Penrose did not address the question ‘why MNEs’ vis-à-vis, let’s say, 
licensing or exports, therefore, she did not deal with the ‘nature of the MNE’. –
Similarly, her 1959 classic book on The Theory of the Growth of The Firm (TGF 
thereafter) did not address the issue why (national) firms either.9 (Moreover, Penrose 
did not explore in any detail the implications of her TGF contribution for the MNE.10) 
 
 The fundamental insight in TGF was that intra-firm knowledge generation (through 
learning) generates excess resources. These motivate managers to expand, as ‘excess 
resources’ can be put to (profitable) use, at (near) zero marginal cost. This 
endogenous knowledge/growth dynamic is realized through managerial ‘productive 
opportunity’ – the perceived dynamic interaction between internal resources and 
external/market opportunity (Penrose, 1959, Chapter V). 
                                               
8
 As discussed in Pitelis (2002a). 
9
 Although she explicitly distinguished between the firm and the market and discussed the boundaries 
issue, she went on to focus on growth, not on the issue of the existence per-se. 
10
 For a speculation as to why, see Kay (1999) and Pitelis (2000) 
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Despite limitations11, we claim here that Penrose’s insight has implications on the 
OLI, our three related questions, and the need for a more endogenous, dynamic, and 
strategic theory of FDI and the MNE (Dunning, 2001). In addition, Penrose’s 
knowledge/learning perspective adds cognitive and entrepreneurial elements, 
currently missing from the OLI, of interest to theory, managerial practice and public 
policy.  We explain these below in the context of Dunning’s triad. 
 
O(wnership) 
 
In TGF O advantages are not monopolistic, at least as far as their process of 
derivation goes. They are efficiency advantages by definition, as they are the result of 
an endogenous knowledge/innovation process. O advantages only become 
monopolistic when firms attempt to capture value by, for example, bases, raising 
barriers to entry, using restrictive practices, etc. All these are discussed in Penrose 
(1959, mainly Chapter VII). In addition in Penrose there are also explicit references to 
both efficiency and monopolistic advantages. For example, Penrose (1959) observes 
that  
“A firm may attempt to entrench itself by destroying or preventing effective 
competition by means of predatory competitive practices or restrictive monopolistic 
devises that relieve it of the necessity of either meeting or anticipating serious 
competitive threats to its position. In such circumstances a firm may grow for a 
considerable period depending on the demand for its products, harassed neither by 
price competition nor by the fear that competitive developments will make its 
products or processes obsolete. Examples of growth over long periods which can be 
attributed exclusively to such protection are rare, although elements of such protection 
are to be found in the position of nearly every large firm.” (1959, pp. 113).  
 
                                               
11
 Notably, the observation that the use of managerial time has positive costs (Marris, 1999) that TGF 
fails to deal with issues of intra-firm conflict (Pitelis, 2000) and that a number of important assertations 
by Penrose have yet to be tested (Pitelis, 2006). 
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Monopolistic advantages are in line with Penrose’s claim that while the process of 
expansion is definitionally efficient, the resulting state need not be - as/when MNEs 
try to capture value through monopolistic practices. This idea introduces the important 
distinction between process and state-type advantages, the latter being potentially 
monopolistic as originally suggested by Hymer. 
 
L(ocation) 
Penrose did not deal with L in TGF. In her preface to the third edition (Penrose 1995) 
she claimed that all the theory of the MNE requires it to suitably adapt her TGF ideas, 
and account for the existence of different nations. This would require accounting for 
inter-national differences in regulatory and tax systems, different laws and cultures, 
etc. (Penrose, 1959: xv). Penrose did not pursue this much further, leaving it to other 
scholars to do so. (We will return to this later, when discussing I.) Nevertheless, the 
Penrosean perspective has important implications on 
resource/asset/knowledge/innovation seeking and augmenting locational advantages 
for FDI. As firms are bundles or resources creating knowledge, it is ‘natural’ for them 
to locate where existing resources/knowledge is such that it can add value to firms’ 
existing resources, knowledge and technological bases and (thus) operations. This 
implication from Penrose’s work is in line with Dunning’s discussion of asset and 
institution seeking Locational advantages (e.g., Dunning 2001, 2005), and more 
recent attempts to build a theory of the meta-national (e.g., Doz et al 2001), which 
consider MNEs as pursuers of global learning, knowledge acquisition and upgrading. 
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I(nternalization) 
Penrose did not deal with I - advantages in the specific context of the MNE.12 
However, she dealt extensively with integration, which she considered as an earlier 
(and more accurate) term for ‘internalization’.13 Accordingly, her views on 
‘internalization’ should be looked at in her analysis of integration. For example, one 
argument she offers for horizontal integration is the acquisition of valuable 
managerial resources (partly in response to the ‘Penrose effect’- limits to growth due 
to limited intra-firm managerial resources) (Pitelis, 2007).  
 
Concerning vertical integration, according to Penrose, one reason for it is the superior 
knowledge, and (thus) ability of firms to cater for their own needs, as they have better 
knowledge of these (Pitelis and Wahl, 1998 and Pitelis, 2007, discuss these points in 
more detail).  
 
Applying such ideas to the case of the MNEs, would suggest resource/knowledge-
seeking superior firm capability-induced FDI.14 The last mentioned is similar to 
Kogut and Zander’s (1993) subsequent ‘evolutionary’ contribution to the MNE (see 
also Verbeke, 2003, for a critical account).15 
 
                                               
12
 The nearest she comes in the book to discussing the MNE is the following: “Often the large firms 
organize their various types of business in separate divisions or subsidiaries” (p. 156) 
13
 In private discussions. Note also that Richardson (1972) too, pursued this approach. In essence the 
two terms are synonymous. 
14
 Also institution-seeking FDI, a more recent important addition to the OLI (Dunning, 2005). 
15
 Being capabilities-based and very Penrosean in nature, this contribution has acquired prominence. 
Yet both the Penrosean view of vertical integration and Kogut and Zander’s view of the MNE, suffer 
from a failure to appreciate that differential firm capabilities are tantamount to relative firm superiority 
on the market (i.e. relative market failure). This also raises the question why - in which context the 
Hymer/Buckley/Casson/Williamson transaction costs-based explanation is of significance. It is 
interesting to note that in her case study on the Hercules Powder Company (Penrose, 1960) she 
provides a reason for vertical non-integration of Hercules’ customers and of Hercules, in terms of 
‘oligopolistic interaction’ arguments, but also in terms of the superior advantages of specialization of 
Hercules’. 
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By bringing central stage the role of learning, the knowledge/learning-based view of 
FDI and the MNE has important implications both for interaction effects between O, 
L and I. Moreover, by incorporating cognition and agency, it calls for a more 
entrepreneurial, forward-looking approach for FDI, the MNE (and more widely), one 
that (tries to account for) anticipated change and to act on its basis. 
 
Starting with interaction effects, these have not been given much attention in early 
literature (Dunning, 2001). They are crucial. O, L and I are dynamically inter-related. 
For example, L advantages once realized serve as O advantages. Similarly, I 
advantages are O advantages too (viz Hymer’s (1972) view that ‘multinationality per 
se’ is an advantage, the standard view that vertically integrated firms may possess 
higher market power, etc., see Pitelis and Sugden (2002) for more on such 
advantages). In turn, I advantages are related to L and O advantages in that the last 
two pose the question what and where to be internalized respectively. In addition, in 
the context of a learning perspective, L and I advantages are endogenously selected as 
O advantages in the very process of firm growth. Crucially moreover O, L and I can 
be/are shaped by firms’ own decisions. Managers ‘productive opportunity’ is in part a 
result of their own efforts to shape the firms’ internal and external environment.16 In 
this context, ‘productive opportunity’ both helps endogenize and shape O, L and I. 
This helps provide a more endogenous, dynamic, entrepreneurial and forward looking 
strategic theory of FDI and the MNE. 
 
                                               
16
 “Firms not only alter the environmental conditions necessary for the success of their actions, even 
more important, they know that they can alter them and that the environment is not independent of their 
own activities” (Penrose, 1959, p. 42) 
 
 12 
Another aspect of the learning perspective, often missed in the literature, is that it 
helps explain whether, what, when, where and how to integrate/internalize. This is a 
crucial limitation of the transaction costs approach, especially Williamson’s (e.g., 
1981) version. Despite his advocacy of ‘bounded rationality’, in his story, firms are 
always able to answer ‘make or buy’ through a solution of a global optimization 
process that includes transaction (and production) costs. If anything, solving this 
problem can be more difficult than the standard neoclassical problem of (production) 
cost minimization-profit maximization. Penrose’s endogenous (perceived and 
imperfect) intra-firm knowledge generation idea provides an answer to the question 
whether to ‘make or buy’ (but also what, when, where and how). These issues are 
beyond the scope of both transaction costs economies and early OLI, as they involve 
learning. They are of importance.  
 
By relying on learning the emergent knowledge-learning-based OLI is more 
concurrent/synchronic and also forward looking yet procedurally (as opposed to 
globally, or even boundedly) rational than its earlier cousins. It implies that proactive 
growing firms must at any given point in time rely on their endogenously generated 
extant ‘productive opportunity’ to make imperfect L and I decisions not just on the 
basis of what reality is perceived to be now, but also on the basis of anticipated 
change. This may require making apparently ‘sub-optimal’ decisions now, which are 
expected to turn out to be superior in the medium or longer terms, if and when 
conditions have changed in the way managers have expected, hoped for and 
importantly, aimed for! Such decisions moreover often need to be made 
simultaneously. A firm contemplating expansion, may have the option of horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate expansion, domestically or cross-border. Its decision is based 
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on existing knowledge, resources and advantages and its implementation represents 
simultaneously a locational, internalization and ownership-related advantage (or dis-
advantage as the case may be). 
 
The Penrose inspired learning-based k OLI is by its very nature more concurrent and 
at the same time forward looking. By helping explain O, L and I endogenously, 
paying more attention to firms efforts to shape O, L, and I, and by recognizing the 
close links and interactions between the three the knowledge-based OLI also needs to 
account for anticipated and aimed for change. It is therefore both more agency-based 
(thus entrepreneurial) and forward looking.  
 
The learning-based OLI is also more in line with concepts such as ‘born-global’ firms 
and meta-nationals. Both are phenomena of limited empirical occurrence (see 
Verbeke and Yuan 2007) yet of high conceptual interest. Born-global firms need more 
than already established firms to simultaneously consider O and L (and perhaps also 
I), while meta-nationals can be seen as global Penrosean resource/knowledge 
seekers/optimizers. 
 
In terms of the three questions posed earlier in this Chapter, the knowledge-learning-
based approach explains ‘why internationalization’ in terms of firms ‘productive 
opportunity’, ‘why internalization’ in terms of ‘superior relative intra-firm ability for 
resource-knowledge transfer as well as resource/knowledge acquisition’, and ‘which 
country’ in terms of ‘perceived relative [dis]advantages of countries as seen from the 
perspective of firms’ productive opportunity’, and for exploitation and acquisition of 
resource/knowledge (and institutional) advantages (see Dunning, 2005, for the latter).  
 14 
 
Three following propositions follow. First; In considering FDI, MNEs attempt to 
simultaneously optimize the O, L and I advantages. Second; Entrepreneurial 
managers may consciously take what they perceive to be suboptimal decisions today 
when/if they expect these decisions to prove superior under perceived changing future 
conditions. Third; Once imperfect decisions are made, entrepreneurial managers will 
aim to shape the perceived ‘productive opportunity’ of their firms to make their 
decisions succeed. 
 
 
All three propositions seem to be well in line with current practice of MNEs. For 
example, by recently undertaking FDI in the UK, through acquisition of the RMC 
Group, the Mexican MNE, Cemex, chooses a location that confers to it an ownership 
and an internalization advantage simultaneously.  
 
As The Economist observes, “The acquisition of the RMC added new expertise in 
ready-mix which was important, and more large-scale construction projects were 
beginning to be undertaken in Mexico, and Cemex’s international competitors began 
to muscle in on the company’s domestic market.” (The Economist, 2005, p. 88). 
 
This quote also shows that Cemex’s choice is not necessarily the optimal one in terms 
of a pure net present value calculus of today’s conditions. Instead, it is based on 
expectations of change both with regard to impending changes in the sector in Mexico 
and emerging competition. Clearly, once Cemex has taken its decision it will also 
have to make the best of it by trying to influence the very changes it expects will take 
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place, in the direction of the decision it has already taken. All this is very consistent 
with, and follows naturally from, the learning perspective. In contrast, Cemex’ 
approach is more difficult to explain in terms of transaction costs, power/efficiency, 
and resource-based reasoning alone, and therefore in terms of the constituent element 
of the OLI.17 Clearly Cemex is only one example, yet possibly representative of the 
behaviour of other MNEs.  
 
To summarize, in today’s knowledge-based, semi-globalized economy, knowledge-
learning-based OLI, is in a better position to: 
1. help explain the derivations of O, L and I advantages endogenously 
2. pay more attention to firms’ efforts to shape/create the O, L and I 
advantages (and (through) their ‘productive opportunity’) 
3. help explain whether, what, when and how to internalize (thus create) I 
(and L) advantages 
4. emphasize the interaction between O, L and I 
5. emphasize the forward looking nature of decisions on O, L and I 
6. can explain apparently sub-optimal decisions, taken on the basis of 
entrepreneurial manager’s assessment of anticipated change 
7. assert/predict that entrepreneurial managers will try to influence change so 
as to suit their decisions; once they have taken them. 
 
 
All these help develop a more endogenous dynamic, strategic, cognition-based and 
entrepreneurial forward looking theory of FDI and the MNE.  
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 Our support is consistent with Dunning’s most recent writings on MNEs as agent of institutional 
change (see Dunning and Lundan, 2006). 
 16 
III Economic Integration, Competitiveness and Catching-up: the role of FDI 
and Firm Clusters  
 
Economic integration between nations is effected when countries which are currently 
worse-off improve their economic performance at a faster rate than that of the current 
leaders. In this context, an analysis of economic integration requires addressing the 
issue of “competitiveness” and “catching-up”.  
 
The concept of “competitiveness” is both elusive and controversial, especially when 
applied to nations. For example, Krugman (1994) lamented the “obsession” of policy 
makers with the issue of “national competitiveness”, claiming that this obsession can 
be dangerous. One of Krugman’s critiques refers to competition between firms and 
nations. Firms do compete, in his view, for example for market shares, and this 
competition is zero-sum. Instead, nations do not compete in a comparable way, and 
the outcome is positive-sum: when one benefits, the others do too. For Krugman, the 
best measure of national economic performance is total factor productivity (TFP) – a 
proposition also supported by Porter (1990). 
 
Krugman’s views have been subjected to a battery of criticisms, see Aiginger (2006a, 
b) for a recent account, albeit not so much on his views on competition. These, we 
believe, are not immune to criticism. Following, for example, Allyn Young’s (1928) 
work on increasing returns, we appreciate that competition between firms is one 
fundamental way through which markets are created and expanded, suggesting that 
inter-firm competition need not always be a zero-sum game. On the other hand, when 
nations compete through strategic trade policies, Krugman’s own work shows that the 
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outcome need not be positive-sum, (Krugman 1986, 1989). Fundamentally, however, 
competition and competitiveness are not synonymous. In its more generic sense 
competitiveness refers to the ability of an economic entity to outperform its own 
“peer” group, in terms of a shared objective. For example, if the objective is to 
improve a country’s per capita income in terms of purchasing power parity, and if 
other nations share a similar objective, a country that outperforms the others in terms 
of this objective can be defined as more “competitive”. This competitiveness could be 
achieved through apparently rivalrous actions (e.g. strategic trade policies), co-
operative actions, a combination of the two (co-opetition), or just no interaction 
whatsoever; a country can outperform another without necessarily engaging in trade 
with it, or even in trade. In fact, such a generic definition of competitiveness can be 
applicable to individuals, firms, regions, even universities and courses, such as 
MBAs, as we well know. What changes is the peer group and thus the shared 
objective, (which for example in the case of MBA courses, would be to outperform 
other universities with a comparable MBA course, ranked on the basis of a widely 
accepted index). A useful characteristic of this definition is that it has immediate 
implications for catching-up. For example, if an existing developing country is more 
competitive than the leading nations, this leads to catching-up. 
  
Arguably, one can distinguish four major extant approaches-frameworks on 
competitiveness and catching-up; the neoclassical economic theory-based approach, 
the Japanese practice-based one, the “systems or innovations” view and Michael 
Porter’s “Diamond”. Despite some overlapping (especially between the last three) we 
aim to show below that there are sufficient differences too, between the four 
models/frameworks, to qualify them as separate.  
 18 
 
The neoclassical view has a very long and distinguished history; the issue of the 
nature and determinants of the Wealth of Nations was central in Adam Smith (1776), 
while the importance of international trade in this context was a main concern of 
David Ricardo (1817). In its modern developments, (exogenous) growth theory 
includes the landmark contribution of Solow (1956) while, more recently, endogenous 
growth theory, includes scholars such as Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986, 1990). The 
main difference between the two types of views is that “endogenous” growth theory 
tries to account for the (endogenous) role of “technical change”, human capital and 
“increasing returns”, which were previously treated as exogenous variables, see 
Solow (2000) and Fine (2000) for critical assessments. In international trade, 
neoclassical theory built on the idea of David Ricardo that free trade, based on 
comparative productivity advantages can benefit all nations. The well known 
Heckscher, Ohlin, Samuelson (HES) model relies on comparative advantage 
(abundance) in factor endowments, and confirms the Ricardian ideas under conditions 
of non-increasing returns, see for example Samuelson (1962). More recently, 
however, strategic trade theorists, such as Paul Krugman (1987, 1989) question the 
predictions of the HES model, for the case of imperfect competition, increasing 
returns, spill-over effects, and first-mover advantages. In such cases, Krugman shows 
that strategic trade policies (in support of some sectors and firms) could at least 
theoretically favour a nation that leverages them (see Krugman 1992). On the other 
hand, strategic trade policies can lead to conflicts over the division of benefits, and are 
plagued by the possibility of “government failures” (in identifying the right 
sectors/firms), and possible retaliations, leading to a potential lose-lose situation, 
Boltho and Allsopp (1987). In the case of high adjustment costs, characterizing the 
 19 
case of inter-industry trade (more common in cases of countries at different levels of 
economic development), the aforementioned problems could be accentuated 
(Krugman 1989, 1992). Deraniyagala and Fine (2001) provide a critical assessment of 
the theory and evidence of trade theory and policy.  
 
Concerning the “competitiveness” of a nation, the implications of exogenous growth 
and the HES model, on the one hand, and the endogenous growth theory and new 
trade theory, on the other hand, can be at odds. Exogenous growth theory and HES 
assert that perfectly competitive markets, alongside free comparative-advantage-based 
trade, can optimise national and global resource allocation, therefore lead to 
competitiveness and convergence, see Verspagen (2005). Convergence follows 
directly from the implied negative relationship between the growth rate of capital 
stock and the initial level of capital stock. This “absolute convergence” is not 
empirically confirmed, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). On the other hand, while 
“conditional convergence” and/or “club convergence” could be more likely for 
countries sharing comparable key fundamentals, like saving rates, underlying long-
run growth rates and capital stock depreciation, recent evidence does not seem to be 
in support either of them, Baddeley (2006). The role for government intervention in 
the context of exogenous growth – HES theory, is rather modest,, to addressing 
problems of market failure (such as imperfect competition), ensuring no barriers to 
trade, and aim for temporary increases in the growth rate by increasing investments in 
plant, equipment, human capital and R&D, see Solow (1997). 
 
The implications and predictions of endogenous growth and new trade theories are 
more complex and more open to government intervention, especially in their 
interaction. For example, endogenous growth theory views increasing returns and 
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(thus) imperfect competition as a contributor to growth, while the new trade theory 
regards the same factors as reasons for possible strategic trade policies. In 
combination one can foresee a situation where governments promote imperfectly 
competitive markets in order to promote growth at the national level, while at the 
same time protecting their imperfectly competitive sectors and firms, in order to gain 
advantages from (strategic) trade. The above are not the only policy implications of 
the two theories, yet such implications are consistent with them, while they are 
inconsistent with the exogenous growth-HES views.18 
 
An implication from the above as regards the neoclassical theory of competitiveness 
is that it consists of two major variants with different assumptions, and inconsistent 
prescriptions. Perhaps more importantly, the neoclassical theory is ill-equipped to deal 
with the creative role of markets (as opposed to their allocative functions, once they 
exist). This renders it of limited use to analysing issues of competitiveness and 
catching-up, see Kaldor (1972), Audretsch (1989), North (1994), Amsden (1997), 
Nelson and Winter (2002). In the words of Nobel laureate Douglass North (1994): 
“Neoclassical theory is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies 
that will induce development. It is concerned with the operations of markets, not with 
how markets develop. How can one prescribe theories when one doesn’t understand 
how economies develop?” (p.359). 
 
                                               
18
 Endogenous growth theories can also predict “divergence”, instead of convergence, and that ceteris 
paribus larger countries will grow faster than smaller ones; see Verspagen (2005), who also 
distinguishes between “convergence” (refers to the world level) and catching-up (that refers to 
individual countries) and discusses the similarities and differences between endogenous growth and 
evolutionary views. Divergence is also implied by contributions in agglomeration and new geography 
economics, see Henderson (2005) and below. Feenstra (1996) suggests that in the absence of 
knowledge diffusion divergence is more likely than convergence in open economy models of 
endogenous growth. 
 21 
Concerning “old growth theory”, Robert Solow (1997) almost admits as much, but 
suggests that one should turn “more naturally to Max Weber than to a modern growth 
theorist” (p.72), in order to explain the role of institutions, attitudes and 
“modernisation” (versus “growth” of an already modernised economy). Solow goes 
on to suggest that the fundamental differences between old (exogenous) and new 
(endogenous) growth theory, are that the former aims to explain trend-lifting growth, 
not trend-tilting one (growth policies that simply lift the trend as opposed to 
increasing the rate of growth per-se). The latter is achieved by endogenising 
technological change, but also at a potentially huge cost of hard to test assumptions, 
too much importance on the role of investment decisions on growth rates and fragile, 
too powerful and rather dangerous conclusions. In his conclusion “the forces 
governing the scope of the potential trend – the sustainable rate of growth- are 
complex, technological, and even a little mysterious. What we do know how to do is 
to lift the potential trend by a few percent. Even if the slope remains as before, that is 
a fine achievement” (Solow 1997, p. 92) 
 
The macroeconomic policy prescriptions deriving from the analytical foundations of 
the neoclassical perspective have been encapsulated in the various versions of the 
Washington and post-Washington-type policy advice to developing and transition 
economics, see Shapiro and Taylor (1990). Their record has been at least 
questionable, see Stiglitz (2001), Rodrik (2004), Dunning (2006), Serra and Stiglitz 
(2008).19 
                                               
19
 For Stiglitz (2001) “The advocates of the neoliberal Washington consensus emphasize that it is 
government interventions that are the source of the problem; the key to transformation is “getting 
prices right” and getting the government out of the economy though privatization and liberalization. In 
this view, development is little more than the accumulation of capital and improvements in the 
efficiency with which resources are allocated–purely technical matters. This ideology misunderstands 
the nature of the transformation itself–a transformation of society, not just of the economy” (pp. xiv). 
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A second approach to competitiveness and catching-up is that adopted by the 
Japanese government during the post-second world war reconstruction effort. While 
more pragmatic than theory-based, the approach has subsequently been 
“deconstructed” by scholars both Japanese and Western in a way that unearths the 
theoretical insight of the Japanese policies, see for example Best (1990), Amsden 
(1989), Wade (1990), Shapiro and Taylor (1990), Pitelis (1994). In addition, variants 
of the Japanese approach have been adopted by the various “tiger” economies of the 
East Asia, justifying, we feel, the term the “Japanese”- East Asian approach (Pitelis 
1994, 2001).  
 
An important characteristic of the Japanese approach is an interventionist stance of 
the government in close contact/partnership with industry, and with the explicit aim to 
restructure the economy in a way that creates competitive advantages, as opposed to 
simply accepting existing comparative advantages. In this context, elements of the 
industrial/competitiveness strategies of the country, devised and implemented in 
Japan by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly known as 
MITI), included: the targeting and support of specific firms and sectors (which were 
perceived to be important in terms of high value-added, high income elasticities of 
demand and oligopolistic with high profit margins). These sectors and firms were at 
first protected from international competition, through managed-trade policies. Intra-
sector competition was managed too, in the sense that in each sector the major players 
should be not too many, but not too few either (so as to avoid collusive practices, but 
also to avoid resource dissipation and create critical mass). In effect that was managed 
locally-based big-business competition. To ensure technology transfer, in the absence 
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of foreign direct investment (which was discouraged), MITI encouraged an aggressive 
policy of buying licenses from foreign firms. To ensure competition from below to 
big players, thus a relatively level playing field, MITI required that firms purchasing 
licences would make them accessible to smaller players, Hill (2006). In addition, 
Japanese firms pursued a corporate strategy of growth and market share acquisition, 
not short-term profit maximisation, see Best (1990). 
 
In the above context, a number of other characteristics of the Japanese approach 
included new innovative methods of doing business (for example, just-in-time), 
human resource management, worker participation, and others such as total quality 
management. All these have been widely discussed in the literature and were felt by 
many (e.g. Best 1990, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Pitelis 1994, Grabowski 1994, 
Shapiro/Taylor 1990) to have contributed to the remarkable performance of the 
Japanese economy, up to the late 1980s when it was leading global markets in sectors 
such as electronics, semiconductors and automotives, see Hill (2006). Variants of the 
Japanese approach were adopted by the “tiger” economies, such as South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore (see Pitelis 1994, Chang 1994) and, more recently, by the 
Chinese government (Nolan 2001, Lin 2004) and other tiger economies, such as 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (see Jomo et al. 1997) and Vietnam 
(Chesier/Penrose 2007). A difference to the Japanese approach, of interest to the 
current paper, is that smaller economies, like Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, did 
not discourage, but rather encouraged FDI, albeit in a way that was perceived to be 
aligned to the overall competitiveness strategy (Pitelis 1994, Jomo 1997).20 
 
                                               
20
 For a more detailed and nuanced account of similarities and differences between the various East 
Asian countries, see Shapiro and Taylor (1990), Rodrik (2004), and for differences between older and 
newer ‘tigers’ see Jomo et al. (1997). 
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There is extensive and heated debate on the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the 
Japanese approach, including the possibility that the subsequent decline of Japanese 
economic performance could be attributed to this original interventionist model, see 
Pitelis (2001). The simple fact is that it is not easy to tell. Moreover, even if we accept 
that the Japanese approach was successful, other factors might also be in play. These 
include the effectiveness of the political-bureaucratic structure (less government 
failure, so to speak) as well as cultural, institutional, and macroeconomic issues, see 
Shapiro and Taylor (1990) and Pitelis (2001). We do not wish to re-enter this debate 
here. However, we do wish to point out that many of the fundamental presumptions of 
the Japanese competitiveness strategy did receive theoretical support, from one source 
or another. For example, the emphasis on big-business competition, the pursuit of 
market share, the emphasis on innovation of all types (including organisational, 
managerial and human resources) and the pursuit of long term profit through market 
share, are all in line with the work of scholars such as Schumpeter (1942), Penrose 
(1959), Chandler (1962), Baumol (1991) and others, and even more recent 
endogenous growth theory-based approaches, see Lucas (1988), Romer (1986). A 
focus on targeting of “strategic” sectors is in line with early development economics 
thinking on “infant industries” and more recent “new trade theory”, see Kaldor 
(1972), Krugman (1987, 1989), Shapiro and Taylor (1990). The emphasis on 
domestic competition is in line with arguments by Porter (1990) – see below. The 
support of SMEs and clusters seems to find accord with almost all economic 
perspectives, albeit for different reasons (e.g. entrepreneurship, agglomeration 
economies, cluster-building, locally-based development, challenge to multinationals, 
etc), see Krugman (1991a, b), Porter (1990) and Henderson (2005). 
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It is clear too that mistakes were made, and I believe that the failure of the Japanese to 
gradually give more space to market forces, could indeed partly explain subsequent 
difficulties. This is also in line with theoretical prescriptions, concerning the 
identification of the “optimal” mix between planning and markets and between 
market, hierarchy and co-operation.21 Important for our purposes here is that the 
Japanese-East Asian perspective could be seen as a developmental-competitiveness 
approach in its own right. It has clear implications on catching-up – indeed the whole 
philosophy and purpose of the approach is to catch-up through creating and capturing 
value faster than other countries -as well as implications on FDI and country size, to 
which we return below. 
 
A third approach to competitiveness involves work under the evolutionary, resource 
and systems-perspective and varieties of - comparative capitalism banners. Much of 
this has been encapsulated in the “systems of innovation”, agglomeration and clusters 
and varieties of capitalism-related literature, see Lundvall (1988), Krugman 
(1991a,b), Nelson (1995), Freeman (1995), de la Mothe and Paquet (1997), Fagerberg 
et al (2005), Jackson and Deeg (2006), Jovanovic (2009), and Lundvall (2007) for a 
recent summary, assessment and proposed extensions. A main characteristic of the 
evolutionary and systems-based views is a focus on intertemporal efficiency effected 
through innovation, combined with the belief that innovation is best promoted not by 
an exclusive focus to free and competitive markets, but by big-business competition 
and systems-wide linkages that involve markets, hierarchies (firms, governments), co-
operation and competition, NGOs and more wider social capital-promoting 
institutions and organisations, see Freeman (1995), Jackson and Deeg (2006). The 
                                               
21
 For example it is arguable that a more hands-on approach by government is required at the catching-
up phase, while once a country has reached the “technological frontier” so to speak more focus on 
market signals may be appropriate. 
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strength or otherwise of the innovation-system depends on the linkages of the whole 
system and on government policies, and institutions that promote innovation. Markets 
are but a part of the system, albeit an important one (see Stiglitz 1989). They need not 
be competitive, indeed big business competition may well have innovation-promoting 
advantages, see Nelson (1995) and/or Nelson and Winter (2002). In addition, the 
existence and promotion of agglomeration and clusters by small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) can be a potent means to promote linkages, diversity, and (thus) 
innovation, see Fagerberg et al (2005), Metcalfe (2002), Wignarajah (2003).22  
 
It is arguable that the systems perspective is focused more on value creation through 
innovation than value capture, (therefore catching-up), albeit not in all cases, see for 
example the discussion of catching-up in Freeman (1995). It can be argued that the 
promotion of an innovative economy will help engender superior economic 
performance, therefore superior competitiveness and (thus) catching-up. This does not 
fully account however for the possibility that value creation need not always be 
captured by the innovators (Teece 1986, Research Policy 2006) – we will return to 
this later. In addition, the “agglomeration” element of “clustering” may well engender 
inter-regional and inter-national divergence, see Krugman (1991a,b).  
 
It is arguable that dissatisfaction with competitiveness models motivated Michael 
Porter (1990) to identify a gap to be filled. This is one way to explain why someone 
                                               
22
 There is extensive work on “agglomeration” economies, that draws on the work of Krugman (1987) 
on new trade, see Krugman (1991) and Henderson (2005) for a collection of papers. Martin (1999) 
provides a critical assessment. Martin and Sunlay (2003), Pitelis et al (2006) and Jovanovic (2009) also 
discuss the historical antecedents of agglomeration and “clusters”-type literatures. For our purposes, 
agglomeration economies by themselves imply divergence, but also the possibility to catch-up, by 
diagnosing and upgrading agglomerations. Kottaridi et al (2008) provide an empirical test of the role 
agglomeration plays in attracting FDI, in the context of UK regions; the results are in line with the idea 
that agglomeration and the location of R&D labs by subsidiaries are positively correlated.  
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should be writing a book in 1990 on a topic that goes as far back as the origins of 
modern economics (Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 1776), and so extensively 
discussed since. Porter’s “Diamond” approach suggests that the coexistence of 
appropriate factor conditions, demand conditions, firm and sectoral structure and 
strategy and related and supporting industries, engenders a “Diamond” and/or 
“clusters” of economic success-competitiveness. 
 
Many of the elements of the “Diamond” are present in extant works, for example 
“factor conditions” in the HOS model; demand conditions in Vernon’s (1966) work 
on the “product-life-cycle”, related and supporting industries, in the works of 
Marshall (1920) and work on clusters (see Best 1990, Edquist 2005), industry 
structure and rivalry in the works of Industrial Organisation (IO) scholars, see Tirole 
(1988). However, Porter added new insights and dimensions, notably firm strategy. 
This draws on strategic management and Porter’s earlier works (Porter 1980, 1985), 
and it is a breakthrough vis-a-vis neoclassical competitiveness models, which usually 
focus on macroeconomic considerations at the expense of firm-level analysis. The last 
mentioned is critical, as it can help shift focus on value capture (a main concern of 
firms) and (thus) up to a point catching-up. 
 
In addition to the above, interesting in Porter’s work is the re-surfacing of 
agglomeration and “clusters” (in the form of related and supporting industries), and in 
their interaction with other parts of the “Diamond”, an emphasis on specialised, rare 
and hard to imitate factors (which is very much the theme of the resource-based view 
of firm strategy – see Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991), Peteraf (1993)), his emphasis 
on the importance of local as opposed to distant (such as international) rivalry, and a 
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focus on demanding and sophisticated consumers (not just undifferentiated aggregate 
demand, as in the Keynes (1936), tradition). All these are quite impressive and help 
explain Porter’s successful journey from IO to strategy to national competitiveness 
policy scholarship and advice. 
 
Concerning FDI, the four models have different implications and/or recognise 
different roles for it. In the neoclassical HOS model of international trade, FDI can be 
one of the mechanisms whereby factors and resources are transferred from where they 
are abundant to where they are scarcer, thus contributing to catching-up, see Stiglitz 
(2001). In the Japanese Far Eastern approach, FDI is a means to an end, it is used to 
serve the end of catching-up. In some cases, when technology transfer can be effected 
without FDI, alternatives are chosen; for example licensing in Japan, joint ventures in 
the earlier phases of Chinese opening-up to international markets, see Nolan (2001). 
When FDI is deemed to be necessary for industrialisation, it is encouraged, but placed 
as much as possible within the context of the industrial strategy objectives, as in 
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan (Shapiro/Taylor 1990, Chang 1994, Pitelis 1994, Jomo 
et al. 1997, Amsden, 2009). In the systems-perspective, FDI is seen as part of the 
system – it may help strengthen already extant linkages, but could also be of limited 
import, if footloose and stand-alone, see Freeman (1995). Finally, in the “Diamond”, 
FDI is seen as a measure of success, indeed outward investment is claimed by Porter 
(1990) to be no less than a sign of “competitiveness”. Others, e.g. Dunning and Pitelis 
(2008), question this optimism, seeing both positive and negative elements. In 
addition Dunning (1993), as well as Rugman and Verbeke (1993), extended Porter’s 
approach to include the potentially important role of FDI in affecting the determinants 
of the “Diamond”. There has also been extensive work on the potential 
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interrelationship between FDI and clusters, see among others Freeman (1995), Pitelis 
(2001), Rugman and Verbeke (1993), Cantwell and Iammarino (2000) and Pitelis et al 
(2006). 
 
There are few direct implications from the above models on the issue of country size, 
with the possible exception of the endogenous growth theory, where market-size 
facilitates growth. On the other hand, the ability, for example of Japan and China, to 
make MNE entry their markets conditional on licensing or joint ventures could well 
be attributed to the attraction to MNEs of the large size of the market of these 
economics, alongside the bargaining power that this attraction afforded to them. In 
contrast, the pursuit of more proactive inward investment strategies by smaller 
players, (e.g. Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore), could be attributed to that their 
market size was not by itself a sufficiently attractive proposition for MNEs – so more 
proactive FDI policies were required to foster development. 
 
In the next section, we build on extant theory to develop a competitiveness framework 
that aims to address some problems of existing theories. In particular, none of the 
competitiveness frameworks or approaches discussed here has an explicit link 
between competitiveness at the micro (firm), meso (sectoral, regional) and macro 
levels; there is no explicit discussion of the issue of value capture for catching-up, 
versus value creation (which may be captured by others), and (thus) the 
interrelationship between value capture for catching-up strategies and value-wealth 
creation strategies. Indeed, some models of national competitiveness are ill-equipped 
to even address such issues, as they tend to rely on macro-categories, at the expense 
of the micro level (for example strategic management), where value capture is far 
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more prominent. In this context, we feel that work on national competitiveness could 
benefit from insights derived from the international strategic management literature, 
when applied, suitably modified to the national level. Last, but not least, work on 
international business and strategy can also have useful implications on the choice of 
developmental model by countries. 
 
IV A Novel Framework for Competitiveness and Catching-up  
 
The limited discussion of micro-(firm-level)-foundations and the lack of an explicit 
focus on superior value capture capabilities (which can lead to catching-up) are two 
major limitations of extant theory.23 Both can be addressed by strategic management 
scholarship, which on the other hand, (excepting Porter and some scholars of the 
systems-approach), is mostly alien to competitiveness theories, which are mainly 
macro-based (see Nelson/Winter 2002).24 To go beyond noticing this, it would be 
useful to identify factors that engender value and wealth, at the firm level, but also the 
meso and macro levels, when suitably understood and aggregated-augmented. 
 
The concept of value, first, is very loaded in economics and management (see Dobb 
1973, and Bowman/Ambrosini 2000 respectively). To avoid entering the interesting, 
albeit unresolved yet, debate on the nature and theories, of value, we focus instead on 
                                               
23
 For a relatively recent comprehensive discussion on catching-up, see Fagerberg and Godinho (2005) 
and Fagerberg and Srholec (2005). The authors deal with most levels of analysis, but not the very 
micro (strategic management) one, as they themselves acknowledge.  
24
 Microfoundations, in the sense of optimising behaviour by economic agents, is at the very heart of 
the neoclassical theory, not least its endogenous growth variety (see Fine, 2000). In this context our 
claim may sound paradoxical. However, it is simply in line with the well known criticism by Coase 
(1937), Penrose (1959) and others, that the neoclassical theory treats the firm as a black-box. What 
microfoundations there exist are in terms of profit maximising black-boxes, or the price-output 
decision of firms – not the creative role of firms and its impact on the macroeconomy. It is this type of 
microfoundations that we have in mind, that it is missing and that requires much more work and 
progress than there exists, including our own limited contribution here. 
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the much better understood concept of “value added”. Of course, this still incorporates 
the word “value”, a definition of which seems inescapable (yet is missing and/or 
highly contested in the literature, see Dooley 1990). For our purposes, we propose 
value to be defined as perceived worthiness of a product or service to a (potential 
and/or target) user. In this context, value added is the additional value conferred to a 
product or service by an economic agent, be this an individual, a firm, a sector, or a 
nation. Value added can be potential or realized. It is potential before users have been 
convinced to pay a market price to purchase the product or service, and it is realized 
once the product or service is purchased. Value-added may never be realized if 
consumers lack the power to purchase (effective demand) and/or when sellers are 
outcompeted by rivals who possess substitute products, and/or superior competitive 
advantages (such as complementary assets and capabilities, see Teece 1986). This 
renders a discussion of value realization and value appropriation/capture strategies 
critical.  
 
Value added is engendered in two fundamental ways: one is through increased 
efficiency and/or productivity, therefore a reduction of the cost of production; the 
other is an increase in the perceived utility-worthiness of the product or services 
through “differentiation”.25 This can be due to real factors, such as increased 
functionality and/or aesthetic appeal, or to “imaginary” factors, effected for example 
through advertising. There are long debates on these issues in industrial organisation 
(IO) and strategic management (see Tirole 1988, Grant 2005); usually real and 
imaginary elements coexist, and it is arguable that through innovation, cost reductions 
                                               
25
 It could be argued that “utility” suffices and that cost production is of no additional use, as 
neoclassical economists do, see Robbins (1935). However, this would preclude one route through 
which perceived utility may increase; for business this is important. In any event, most neoclassical 
textbooks use the Demand-Cost Curve apparatus, which incorporates both a utility (through Demand) 
and cost (through the Cost curve) element. 
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and increased appeal (product differentiation) can take place simultaneously (see 
Pitelis and Taylor 1999, who propose a “value for money” strategy that integrates 
Porter’s 1985 two major “generic strategies”-cost leadership and differentiation). 
 
The crucial question is what are the major determinants of value added at the firm 
level, and to what extent the same or similar determinants exist at the meso and macro 
levels; so as to build on the firm-level microfoundations, in order to derive the 
determinants of the wealth of a nation. Drawing on extant theory of economics and 
management, Pitelis (2004) suggests that four major factors interact to explain value-
added (through efficiency and/or differentiation) at the firm level: firm strategy and 
infra-structure; unit cost economies/increasing returns; resources, notably human 
ones; and technology and innovativeness. The importance of all four factors is well 
rehearsed in the literature, which involves virtually all all-time classics in economics 
and management. Important, however, in this framework is that the same four factors 
can be re-interpreted to apply to the meso (region, industry, sector) and macro-levels 
(Pitelis, 2004), thus allowing a relatively smooth aggregation, based on 
microfoundations. 
 
The emergent “Wheel of Value” is shown in Figure 1; 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The “wheel” has the added advantage that one can examine in its context, the role of 
FDI, clusters and government (policy) as well as their interrelationships, as these 
interact and impact on all three levels. For example, Figure 1 shows that large size, 
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and FDI by MNEs as well as clusters (by SMEs and/or MNEs), and the “government” 
(policies) are interrelated (with clusters attracting FDI and FDI creating and/or being 
linked to clusters, and government policy affecting and/or being affected by both), 
and they all impact on the determinants of value-added. The impact, however, need 
not always be positive or beneficial. FDI can do harm, or good; clusters can lead to 
congestion effects, or wither away (see Martin/Sunlay 2003; Jovanovic, 2009); 
governments can be corrupt and/or ineffective and (thus) create (as opposed to 
solving) market failures see Krueger (1974), Shapiro and Taylor (1990) and Stiglitz 
(1998) for discussions.  
 
Identifying the major determinants and actors of potential value added need not lead 
to realized value and wealth. This is where strategic management becomes crucial in 
informing policy makers. In particular, the determinants of value added in the “wheel 
of value” impact on potential value, not realized value, with one exception: that of 
firm (sector, industry and/or national) strategy. At the macro economic level, there 
has been limited interest on the issue of strategies for capturing value. Instead, in IO 
and strategic management, there is extensive discussion on strategies for value 
realization/capture. There are four major types of such strategies: integration, 
diversification, and cooperation strategies; “generic strategies”; entry deterrence 
strategies (through strategic or “innocent”-technological barriers to entry); and “firm 
differentiation/heterogeneity” strategies - see Pitelis (2009) for an account. There is 
some overlap and extensive interaction between these strategies (for example, Porter’s 
(1985) “generic strategies” include two out of the four barriers to entry of Bain 
(1956), namely product differentiation and cost advantages). It is also arguable that 
such strategies are co-determined and co-evolving. Nevertheless, crucial about them is 
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that in their interaction with product promotion and competitive strategies they help 
firms to realize potential value as profit, and capture more value than their 
competitors (sometimes even by capturing potential value created by their 
competitors, see Pitelis 2009, and Research Policy 2006).  
 
It is arguable, that such strategies for value realization and value capture are 
applicable at the meso and national levels, albeit to different degrees. For example, 
countries can use strategic trade/protectionist policies. In addition, countries (and 
regions) may adopt regional/national differentiation strategies by strengthening, 
engendering and/or promoting their comparative or competitive advantages. In some 
cases, integration (or dis-integration) strategies are adopted by nations (for example, 
the integration of Germany, or the de-integration of countries from the former Soviet 
Union). Regional integration of countries, such as the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN, is 
common. The concept of generic strategies is also of much relevance to nations, who 
may choose (or turn out) to be cost leaders (e.g. China in manufacturing, India in IT 
services) differentiation (e.g. Italian design), or niche strategies (for example, 
Switzerland in banking and/or watches). More complex cases, could involve attempts 
to combine elements of niche (cost leadership and/or product differentiation) in 
specific activities (like for example, Finland in the case of mobile telephony). Such 
strategies, in addition, can be partly history-determined, partly the result of policy 
initiatives, or usually a combination of both, such as the Finnish case - see Hill 
(2006). Fagerberg et al (2005), Freeman (1995) and Shapiro and Taylor (1990) 
provide discussion of various cases. 
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An awareness of the determinants of potential value added and the factors that can 
help realize/capture value can provide useful insights to policy makers who seek to 
achieve superior economic performance to that of their peers. At the broadest possible 
level, a superior ability to create and, especially, capture value in international 
markets is tantamount to superior economic performance by a particular nation. The 
mix of market/hierarchy/cooperation, private-public-hybrid, institutional, micro and 
macroeconomic policy, and the effectiveness and innovativeness of institutions, 
organisations and policies, will tend, in their interaction, help the “leaders” and 
“laggards”, in this game, see Abramovitz (1986) and, for a critical survey, Fagerberg 
and Godinho (2005). It is not possible to go into further detail on exact policies here. 
This would, in effect, be the economic equivalent of searching for the “holy grail” 
(but see Shapiro and Taylor (1990), Solow (1997), Rodrik (2004) and Serra and 
Stiglitz (2008) for more on this.26) Instead, our aim here is to draw on the discussion 
above in order to discuss the relationship between FDI and economic integration in 
the context of our framework and discussion. 
 
IV Competitive Advantage, Competitive Positioning and Vehicles to 
Competitiveness and Catching-up 
 
Countries need to diagnose their comparative advantages, and reach a decision on 
whether they wish to “compete” on their basis, or to try to develop new competitive 
advantages, in activities, where they perceive to have more potential for the country 
                                               
26
 Shapiro and Taylor (1990) discuss seven “boundary conditions” that can help devise and implement 
successfully state developmental policies, country size being one of them-see below.  Rodrik (2004) 
distinguishes between first principles (market-based competition, property rights, incentives, sound 
money) and the plethora of specific policies that can be in line with the first principles, in an attempt to 
explicate the failure of “Washington consensus-type policies”, while salvaging the core of the 
neoclassical agenda.  
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and in international markets. Countries, that is, need to diagnose their “productive 
opportunity” (Penrose 1959), (the dynamic interaction between their internal 
resources and competencies and the external opportunities and threats). Sometimes, 
potential advantages are latent and hard to identify. For example, in many transition 
economies post-1989 in Eastern Europe, people found themselves with ample time at 
their disposal and few opportunities for employment. Many were educated with 
mathematical and computing aptitudes. Some originally used these for quasi-illegal or 
outright illegal IT-related activities. In time accumulated expertise could be applied to 
legitimate activities, and help create IT clusters (for example in Romania). This latent 
IT cluster was possible to diagnose already in the early 1990s, and indeed it was 
diagnosed in some studies (see Pitelis 1997). The desired mix of comparative and 
competitive (comparative-to-be) advantages for each country and for each case 
requires in-depth investigation and cannot be decided on a priori grounds without 
analysis on the ground. 
 
Once the comparative or competitive advantages have been diagnosed, selected and 
pursued (in the case of competitive ones), the next decision is the positioning stance. 
Building on our earlier analysis, countries, like firms, could choose to position 
themselves along the relative cost-differentiation (“Image”) spectrum. This is shown 
in Figure 2.   
   
[Figure 2 around here] 
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In the relative cost-differentiation spectrum, the best position to be in is low cost/high 
differentiation. This is normally effected by countries with a high innovation culture 
and performance – with strong “systems of innovation”, so to speak. This allows them 
to simultaneously reduce costs (through organizational and institutional innovation), 
and produce products, services and an “image” (country differentiation) of a leader, 
an innovator, a quality player. Small European players such as Sweden and Finland 
may be cases in point, see Freeman (1995) and Fagerberg et al. (2005) 
 
Countries with high costs and low differentiation are laggards, they produce 
expensive goods and services, and the image of the country is one of low quality. 
High relative costs can be due to low innovative capability, poor infrastructure, lack 
of increasing returns, poor organizational and institutional configuration. Greece in 
the 1980s is an example. 
 
Countries with high costs and high differentiation are likely to be developed ones with 
high technical and operational competencies, but without a strong innovation system, 
at least not presently. These countries can have relatively high costs, because, for 
example, of high labour costs, themselves the result of distributional and welfare 
policies, that resulted from a “glorious past”. Lack of innovative capabilities can be 
the outcome of organisational and institutional sclerosis, an insistence on doing 
already proven things in already proven ways. This lack of curiosity and innovation 
could result in this “stuck in the middle”/question-mark position. It is likely to 
characterize developed economies that somehow have lost their way, their incentive 
to compete and innovate. Germany in the 1990s may be a case in point; so is Britain 
in the 1970s (and it looks like in the 2010s).  
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Low cost, low differentiation economies are also stuck in the middle, but are likely to 
be at an earlier stage of their development, perhaps transition or emerging economies. 
Here unit costs can be low because of very cheap labour and resource costs, but the 
lack of differentiation/comparative or competitive advantages also place them in the 
question-mark category. Eastern European transition economies are cases in point.  
 
There can be intermediate situations, for example, in more recent years, the 
positioning of many South European countries, for example Greece, South Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, has been characterised by a very sui-generis model – that of low 
costs/moderate or even high skills/competencies. Relative costs have been kept low, 
through the creation of the so called 1,000 Euro generation, usually well educated, 
skilful and competent graduates who, however, have to work (often far in excess of 
the 8 hour working day), for Euro 1,000 a month (and indeed in Greece or Portugal 
for as low as Euro 600!). This helps the competitive positions of these countries vis-à-
vis, for example, low cost/low differentiation ones. It is sustained through a sui-
generis, inter-generational transfer of resources (the savings-wealth the parents 
accumulated in previous years), and/or through multiple jobs (when feasible) and grey 
market activities. All these help engender their competitiveness despite the absence of 
a strong innovation culture/system. At one level, they represent a form of indirect 
subsidisation of locally-based firms and industries, which under normal circumstances 
(namely if individuals earned more, the state taxed them and used the taxes to 
subsidize industry), they would be considered as anti-competitive practices, for 
example by the European Commission. They are a form of Non-direct taxation of the 
countries’ middle classes. 
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The relative costs/differentiation matrix does not make an explicit distinction between 
stages of development although it is likely that countries in the first column are likely 
to be developed, while the other less so, or emerging. The matrix can be of help to all 
countries, to identify ways to improve their competitiveness by reducing unit costs, 
improving differentiation, strengthening their innovation capabilities. For example, a 
small country (let’s say island economy), with excellent climate, low costs of labour 
and little manufacturing (thus production costs too), can aim to effect high country 
differentiation (let’s say as a tourist destination), with good service (which need not 
require much higher costs, if effected through cultural/educational means) and low 
costs. Small countries, with ample time to spare, due to lack of employment 
opportunities, could aim to effect differentiation through emphasising service 
provision, e.g. call centres, IT services etc. These are in effect “niche-differentiation” 
strategies. They are likely to be more appropriate for smaller countries which cannot 
compete with an across the board differentiation strategy. 
 
This prescription is supported by the excellent account by Shapiro and Taylor (1990), 
who point to the “importance of specialized, niche-oriented industrial strategies for 
small, open economies” (p. 869) and go on to conclude that “There is no reason why 
production for appropriate niches should not initially be supported by import barriers 
and export subsidies; … full industrialization only occurs when infant firms grow up 
and can compete more or less effectively on international terms” (p. 873)  
 
A third issue that all countries need to assess is the vehicles and policies through 
which competitiveness can be improved. Discussing specific policies is beyond the 
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scope of this paper - see for example Shapiro and Taylor (1990), Rodrik (2004), 
Fagerberg and Gondinho (2005), Pitelis (2007) for more detailed discussions. By 
“vehicles” we refer to “FDI” and “clusters”, as per Figure 1. Both independently can 
impact on all determinants of value creation, see Pitelis et al (2006) for a more 
extensive account. However the sustainability of value capture requires 
embeddedness. This means that countries should preferably aim to create linkages 
between clusters and FDI, so that FDI does not “fly” when conditions change, (e.g. 
costs go up), because margins have also gone up through higher differentiation, 
effected through embeddedness.27          
 
The need for embeddedness is emphasized in the work of Abramovitz (1986), albeit 
he uses the term “social capability”. Abramovitz suggests that differences between the 
levels of development between countries do present opportunities for catching-up and 
convergence, but only provided that these countries have developed a social capability 
adequate to absorb existing more advanced technologies. The concept is very similar 
to that of “absorptive capacity”, on which recent research currently takes place in IB 
scholarship (see Kottaridi et al., 2006 for an account). From our point of view, the 
interest lies in the fact that the building of “social capability” and/of “absorptive 
capacity” is something that involves by definition (viz the word “social”) the 
government and the policy at large – it is not just a matter for the private sector. In 
addition, in our context here, local development effected through clusters represents 
one way through which “social capability” and “absorptive capacity” can be 
                                               
27
 Jomo et al. (1997) comments on the issue of FDI and sustainability in the context of the development 
of the first-tier East Asian countries (like Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) and the 
second-tier ones, like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia as follows: “While the Northeast Asian 
economies have been open to foreign investment, they have also been more selective and have 
emphasised developing national (not necessarily state-owned, except perhaps in Taiwan) industrial, 
technological, marketing and related capacities. In contrast, most rentier entrepreneurs in Southeast 
Asia have not been obliged to deploy their rents at such ends” (p. 163). 
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enhanced. Indeed the presence of clusters can also be seen as a manifestation of the 
existence of social capability that can be fostered through appropriate government 
measures. 
 
The three issues raised above can and should be considered simultaneously. 
Competitive advantages could be linked to the positioning, clusters should be 
diagnosed and upgraded and FDI attracted, in a way that is in line with advantages 
and supports the pursued positioning.28 
 
Another consideration concerns adaptation. Detected advantages and positioning 
should be reviewed regularly to ensure consistency with evolving 
circumstances/stages of development. For example, in order to attract high knowledge 
intensive FDI, it may be useful to discourage some FDI, which may require rendering 
such FDI expensive to firms, through for example a high-wage policy – pursued for 
example by Singapore, Pitelis, (1994), Lall (2000), Fagerberg and Godinho (2005). In 
addition, care should be taken to achieve a coincidence between what (selected) 
MNEs require in their quest to optimize locational advantages (see Buckley and 
Ghauri, 2004), and what the country finds consistent with its advantages/positioning 
strategy. Such policies may become possible, in an era of “fragmentation” (see 
Venables 2003) that allows MNEs to separate the value-chain and choose “optimal” 
locations for each part of their production process. 
                                               
28
 The requisite conditions for achieving these are not easy, and are arguably becoming more stringent 
for reasons related to technological changes (Fagerberg and Verspagen , 2002), but also institutional 
and international governance-related ones. At the time of its economic development, for example, 
Japan could get away with pursuing policies that would be considered as anti-competitive under current 
WTO regulations, and even received US support to implement them. When Washington-consensus-
type free markets, free-trade policies are imposed on catching-up countries, this may be viewed as an 
attempt to “kick away the ladder” (see Stiglitz, 2001; Chang, 2002; and Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005; 
for a discussion). Boltho and Allsopp (1987) showed that in the 1980s protectionism in the form of 
non-tariff barriers, was on the increase. On the other hand, the WTO can help participant countries to 
gain market access, partly offsetting these problems. 
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It is arguable that smaller developing countries have advantages in pursuing such a 
strategy. Small size may help render identification of competitive advantages and 
positioning easier. It could also help with implementation – for example diagnose 
clusters, identify missing linkages, build an innovation system, effect country 
differentiation. Countries like Albania (for example, through the “Albania 1 Euro” 
initiative), Serbia (through its high-tech IT cluster in Vojnodina), Slovenia and even 
Greece through their nation-wide cluster diagnosis and upgrading strategies, help 
show that relatively smaller size can be an advantage - see Pitelis et al (2006). In 
addition smaller countries are less likely to invite retaliatory moves, as they are too 
small to impact on world prices. Importantly smaller countries may only be required 
to make one single choice right, in order to jump-start the process of growth. This 
could involve developing a single leading cluster and/or MNE, such as Nokia in 
Finland or Teva in Israel.  The success of such companies in turn can allow smaller 
countries to move faster from a comparative advantage to a competitive one. Last, but 
not least, in an era characterised increasingly by knowledge-intensity and the 
importance of intellectual assets, it is arguable that a smaller country can institute 
faster and easier a successful programme of skill/capability/knowledge-upgrading  for 
its people – sometimes by also drawing on its diaspora. Greece, Israel, Ireland are 
cases in point.  
 
Another potential advantage of smallness is that it renders community links stronger. 
This could help with creating conditions of trust that can facilitate clustering (albeit 
that could be moderated by cultural factors, as “closeness” can also engender inter-
personal rivalries). In any event, however, smallness is likely to lead to higher per 
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capita remittances, due to stronger family links, thus helping smaller transition 
economies. For example, in an IMF (2005) study, countries with remittances higher 
than 10% of GDP were invariably smaller ones and included labour-exporting 
transition economies, such as Albania and Moldova. With remittances flows only 
second to FDI, this issue is surprisingly under-researched; it could well serve as an 
extra competitive (albeit transitory) advantage for smaller countries.  
 
Clearly the above is not to suggest that small is only beautiful. It is arguable that a 
major liability of smallness is that it renders the incentive to be corrupt higher, as it 
can increase substantially the per capita payoff of corruption. We argued elsewhere 
that corruption which involves not only local politicians, but also MNEs, and which 
can take many different forms, to include regulatory capture, by local monopolies and 
foreign MNEs and rent seeking, can be a potent brake to development (Pitelis, 2004). 
It happens that this is more likely to plague smaller countries, which may offset other 
advantages of smallness. In addition, Nolan et al. (2008) argue that the “global 
business revolution” implies that “firms from low-income countries” access to 
developed country markets has become increasingly dependent upon entering into the 
global commodity chains of core firms based in high-income countries” (p.33)29. This 
and increasing non-tariff barriers, support the observation of new emerging 
difficulties for catching-up. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
29
 Recent research by Monteiro et al (2008), that “subsidiary isolation” can hinder knowledge transfer 
to more “isolated” MNE subsidiaries. One could surmise that more isolated are likely to be subsidiaries 
in more distant, smaller developing economies. 
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V  Summary and Conclusion 
 
We discussed the issue of competitiveness and catching-up in general and for 
catching-up countries in particular, paying attention to the role of FDI and clusters in 
this context. We suggested that extant frameworks for competitiveness lack micro-
(firm-level) foundations, which we aimed to provide. In addition, we claimed that 
competitiveness and catching-up include a value capture (not just value creation) 
element, usually lacking in the predominantly macro-economic approaches to 
competitiveness. In this context, lessons can be derived from strategic management to 
include the issues of positioning, diagnosis and creation of competitive advantages 
and alignment between objectives and means to achieve selected strategies. FDI and 
clusters can serve a country’s competitiveness, especially when they are combined 
and aligned with the country’s competitive advantages and selected competitive 
stance/positioning. Emerging and transition economies may implement such 
strategies. Transition economies could devise strategies for FDI and/in relation to 
clusters that can be aligned to their created competitive advantages and competitive 
positioning to serve the purpose of superior competitiveness, and thus catching-up and 
economic integration. 
 
At the same time the margins of opportunity may becoming narrower – not least 
because of the shifting landscape concerning globalization and global governance, see 
Dunning and Pitelis (2008). It is arguable that successful catching-up could be made 
much easier for emerging economies, were the international community to appreciate 
that such catching-up is good for global economic sustainability. 
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